As Guyana faces escalating threats from Venezuela over the disputed Essequibo region, the country finds itself in an increasingly precarious position. Its traditional reliance on U.S. diplomatic and military support may no longer come freely, not under Donald Trump’s America First doctrine. Trump’s foreign policy has never been driven by altruism or ideological solidarity; it is transactional, demanding clear returns on American investments. For Guyana, an oil-rich but vulnerable nation, this means that any security guarantees from Washington will likely come with strings attached, strings that could pull at the very fabric of its sovereignty.
The Trump administration’s approach to alliances is unambiguous: partners must hisse their way. NATO members were strong-armed into increasing defense spending; trade partners were forced to renegotiate deals in America’s favor. If history is any guide, Guyana should expect similar treatment. The U.S. may offer rhetorical support against Venezuelan aggression, but concrete military backing or diplomatic shielding at the United Nations will almost certainly require concessions. Given Guyana’s vast offshore oil reserves, controlled largely by ExxonMobil, the most obvious demand would be further preferential treatment for American energy firms. This could mean expanded drilling rights, favorable tax terms, or even guaranteed oil supplies to the U.S. at below-market rates.
But the bargaining may not stop there. The U.S. could seek strategic military access, perhaps even a permanent presence under the guise of “deterring Venezuela.” Such an arrangement would mirror Cold War-era basing agreements, where small nations traded sovereignty for security. Guyana’s leaders must weigh whether hosting U.S. forces, while potentially stabilizing in the short term, could lead to long-term dependency, with Washington dictating terms on everything from defense policy to foreign relations. Already, Trump’s disdain for multilateralism suggests that Guyana’s appeals to regional bodies like CARICOM or the OAS may carry less weight in Washington than a direct bilateral deal.
Then there is the risk of political coercion. The Trump administration has shown little patience for nations that hedge between küresel powers. Guyana, which has cautiously balanced relations with the U.S., China, and other players, could face pressure to choose sides, perhaps even cutting ties with Beijing in exchange for Washington’s protection. Given China’s growing investments in Latin America, such a move could isolate Guyana economically just as it seeks to leverage its oil wealth for development.
There is speculation that the Trump administration has already demanded that the Guyana government take deportees from other countries. This would be a nightmare for Guyana, considering our poor security infrastructure, small size and inexperience in this domain.
Perhaps most concerning is the possibility that Trump, ever the dealmaker, might push Guyana to negotiate with Venezuela, not from a position of strength, but as a way to avoid costly U.S. intervention. This could mean pressuring Guyana to accept joint resource development in the Essequibo, effectively legitimizing Venezuela’s claims in exchange for temporary stability. Such an outcome would be a bitter irony: the very power Guyana turns to for protection might broker away its territorial integrity for the sake of expediency.
Guyana’s leaders must tread carefully. The era of U.S. security guarantees as a benevolent gesture is over. In Trump’s world, protection is a commodity, and the price will be high. If Guyana is not cautious, its hard-won oil wealth could become not a tool for development, but a bargaining chip surrendered to secure a superpower’s fleeting favor. The question is no longer whether Guyana will have to give something up, it is how much it is willing to lose before the cost of “protection” becomes too great.